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INtRoductIoN
Theories of justice and theories of democracy are currently facing 
two broad challenges: globalization, and national and cultural pluralism. 
These two challenges represent a revision of traditional approaches in 
both fields. While theories of justice –which until quite recently were 
generally limited to domestic justice– have been the subject of increasing 
interest on a global scale, theories of democracy have questioned: 1) the 
concept of demos when the political collectivity is plural in national and 
cultural terms, and 2) the access of the demos (or the different demoi) to 
the cratos, the present-day multilevel decision-making powers. These two 
revisions are interrelated in such a way as to make it necessary to refine 
the existing values and institutional practices of both liberal democracies 
and the international or global sphere
On the other hand, global justice has usually been understood to mean 
institutional and social justice (political and redistributive issues on a global 
scale). In contrast, issues involving different national and cultural identities 
are usually marginal in reflections on global justice despite the fact that 
human rights include political, social and cultural rights. It is possible that 
the conclusions reached regarding political, social and national/cultural 
issues in relation to global justice will not be identical, as there are clear 
differences between: 1) the values and the kind of pluralism involved, 
2) the actors and empirical cases involved, and 3) the variable degree of 
difficulty in achieving normative and institutional consensus on these issues. 1
This chapter links a conception of global justice, moral cosmopolitanism, 
with plurinational democracies. After giving a brief description of moral 
cosmopolitanism (section 1), I go on to analyse notions of cosmopolitanism 
and patriotism in Kant’s work (section 2) and the political significance 
that the notion of unsocial sociability and the Ideas of Pure Reason 
of Kant’s first Critique have for cosmopolitanism (section 3). Finally, I 
analyse the relationship between cosmopolitanism and minority nations 
based on the preceding sections. I postulate the need for a moral and 
institutional refinement of democracies and international society that is 
better able to accommodate national pluralism than has so far been achieved 
by traditional liberal constitutionalism and cosmopolitanism (section 4).
 
1 Elsewhere I have analysed some of the moral and institutional shortcomings of 
traditional liberalism in plurinational democracies. See Requejo 2005a, 2005b, 2001.
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moRaL cosmoPoLItaNIsm
Broadly speaking, cosmopolitanism is the idea that all human beings 
belong to the same moral collectivity. This is primarily a normative 
conception that creates obligations towards the other members of that 
collectivity, regardless of the specific characteristics such as nationality, 
language, religion, etc, that individuals may possess (moral cosmopolitanism). 
Secondly, cosmopolitanism also refers to a more political idea, one that 
advocates the creation of links between human collectives through a league 
or federation of states and an international system of justice (political 
and institutional cosmopolitanism). It is well known that these general 
ideas on moral, political and institutional cosmopolitanism usually are 
associated with Kant’s work.
More recently, Pogge has offered a specific version of moral 
cosmopolitanism, linking it with three basic elements: individualism (the 
fundamental moral reference is persons, not groups, families, tribes, etc.), 
universality (morality concerns all human beings in equal measure, not 
only those of a specific ethnic group, nation, religion, etc) and generality 
(the moral implication is understood to concern all individuals, not only 
compatriots, members of the same religion, etc.) (Pogge 1994, 90)
Criticisms of the positions of cosmopolitanism can be broken down 
into criticisms of each of these components (Caney 2005, 3-5.). One of 
the most entrenched criticisms of moral cosmopolitanism is the one which 
questions its implicit anthropological roots. Behind the most common 
versions of moral cosmopolitanism one usually finds preconceived notions 
about human nature and a certain intellectual tendency to approach moral 
questions more in monist than in pluralist terms (Tully 1994; Taylor 
1992; Parekh 2000, 1; Requejo 2005a, 1).
 In this sense, cosmopolitism would be flawed in at least two ways: 
On the one hand because it does not match the empirical motivations 
of moral behaviour and would thus be a moralist position based on a 
flawed conception of human beings, and on the other hand because of 
its excessively abstract and therefore empirically impoverished position. 
It would fail to satisfactorily include the specific contextual elements with 
which human individuals and groups make rational and reasonable 
decisions according to their specific values, identities and interests. The 
defence of human dignity and political liberty, for example, probably does 
not have the same consequences in different contexts (e.g., in uninational 
societies, like Germany or Portugal, or in plurinational societies, like 
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Belgium, Spain or Canada). I think that the solution, however, is not 
to reject moral cosmopolitanism but to refine and adjust it according to 
the contexts of its application. Our main theoretical point of reference 
is here Kant’s work. 
cosmoPoLItaNIsm, PatRIotIsm aNd NatIoNaLIsm: a RevI-
sIoN oF KaNt
Kant’s work is commonly used as a reference point in theoretical 
discussions on cosmopolitanism, patriotism and nationalism. However, 
I am not sure that these constant references to Kant’s work are always 
accompanied by an acceptable degree of analytical precision. On the one 
hand, many authors who claim to be cosmopolitan defend a version of 
civic patriotism, albeit often without justifying the compatibility between 
these two positions. On the other hand, cosmopolitan authors’ general 
defence of liberal national patriotism (at times juxtaposed with and not 
very conceptually well distinguished from civic patriotism) is worth 
mentioning, especially when some aspect of their national identity is 
threatened.
Generally speaking, it is possible to say that in relation to cosmopolitanism 
and patriotism, Kant’s work postulates:
1. A kind of moral cosmopolitanism (in the terms previously men tioned)
2. A moderate type of political cosmopolitanism, linked to the league 
of nations, constitutional law and hospitality between nations and 
with respect to foreigners. As is well known, this is a form of 
cosmopolitanism which does not include a coercive power (whether 
it be executive, legislative or judicial) but simply the voluntary 
adoption of supra-state organisations and their rules.
3.  An explicit line of reasoning on the compatibility between moral 
cosmopolitanism and republican-style civic patriotism. Both positions 
generate different duties, but they are two normative ensembles that 
are harmonious or compatible.
4.  A line of reasoning in favour of a form of national patriotism based 
on belonging to a specific national group founded on a common 
ancestry, one’s own customs, etc., and on a set of specific collective 
values.
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The last two aspects listed above highlight the discussion about moral 
cosmopolitanism and its compatibility with two basic types of patriotism 
(civic and national) in plurinational contexts 
civic patriotism
Kant’s civic patriotism is related to the state patriotism and the citizen’s 
patriotism of the republican tradition. The basic values here are liberty, 
equality, res publica and self-government - echoes of classical thought. 
This is a form of patriotism that generates duties that would like to 
believe that they are compatible with the duties associated with moral 
cosmopolitanism. Here Kant must confront a serious difficulty. Kant 
appears to believe he has overcome the possible incompatibility between 
duties, mainly by pointing out that both kind of duties in fact lead us 
towards the same cosmopolitan objective: to get ever closer to perpetual 
peace.2 However, Kant’s approach raises a number of questions about 
whether this compatibility is as harmonious as he would wish it to be 
(not to mention that Kant thinks in an institutional liberal republic). The 
following are a number of critical questions on this issue: Which of the 
two duties is more important when, in practice, resources are scarce? Why 
should the state, the republican polity, be considered unquestioningly as 
a collectivity characterised by solidarity and, moreover, one that takes 
precedence over all the other collectivities? Are the (more consensual or 
more coercive) historical formation processes morally relevant for the 
legitimacy of states? Does this alleged civic patriotism (today we would 
say this constitutional patriotism) which ignores the linguistic, cultural, 
historical, etc. characteristics which are present in all states really exist?3 
It would seem that attempting to base the solidarity of a polity on the 
interaction that exists among its citizens is difficult to defend in moral terms, 
as this interaction may itself be based on previous coercion practised on 
2 P. Kleingeld posits a third type of patriotism in Kant’s work, “trait-based patriotism” 
(Kleingeld 2003: 305). Despite the analytical plausibility of her arguments, I believe 
that the main types of patriotism in Kant are the other two (civic and national). The 
third type is linked to the second and can be subsumed within it. In this paper, I will 
omit this third type of patriotism.
3 For a criticism of the Esperanto-concept of constitutional patriotism, see Requejo 
2005b, 97-100
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particular collectives (wars of annexation, mass deportations, exterminations 
of specific peoples, etc.). In other words, coercion may have preceded 
interaction (European history is full of examples of this kind).
national patriotism
Basically, Kant observes the psychological difficulty of attempting to 
be linked only to cosmopolitan duties and postulates a rejection of this 
position. Using a line of reasoning reminiscent of Hume, Kant posits 
the need to exercise the duties based on some empirical focus which 
assumes an emotive implication in our moral actions. The lack of emotive 
implications in this core would be an obstacle for moral action. From 
here, Kant simply identifies the group of co-nationals as this empirical 
focus, which also generates duties compatible with those linked to moral 
cosmopolitanism. But, as Kleingeld points out, neither the assimilation of 
co-nationals as members of the polity nor the identification between the 
reference empirical focus and the national collectivity seem justified here. 
Other alternative empirical foci can be used.4 Here, Kant’s argument fails 
to meet his usual own high analytical standards. Nevertheless, it points 
towards a proven fact: concretion and emotivity are common ingredients 
of moral motivation. 
In the case of plurinational societies, we always find several at least 
partially competitive nation-building processes. This is reflected in the 
different political positions that emerge when one attempts to establish 
the constitutional recognition of plurinationality itself, the level of the 
self-governments, how to regulate the use of political symbols, how 
the international relations of the state and minority nations should be 
regulated, which historical reconstruction most faithfully reflects the past 
reality in school curricula, etc. I believe that any monist moral conception 
is bound to fail here, as is any pluralist conception which attempts to 
establish a complete arrangement for values and for all practical cases. In 
fact, values related to empirical processes of nation-building are agonistic 
(they compete with each other) making it impossible to establish rational 
hierarchies of a generic nature among them.
The conclusion is that, despite the fact that with the civic version of 
patriotism Kant finds it easier to argue in favour of the compatibility 
4 On this point, I concur with P. Kleingeld’s analysis (2001: 311-314).
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between this version and moral cosmopolitanism, this line of reasoning is 
not without its difficulties. It creates conceptual, empirical and institutional 
difficulties. Civic patriotism does not appear to pass the test of institutional 
practice (similar to the majority of republican notions when there are 
different boundaries for the republic and the nations). Moreover, it is 
a concept that grants hegemony to national majorities at the expense 
of minorities, and which therefore acts as a legitimising tool for the 
status quo of states, wherever the boundaries between them may lie. 
However, Kant’s work makes it possible to incorporate and enrich 
moral cosmopolitanism from foundations that are more agonistic and 
better adapted to the empirical world (and more sensitive to the rights of 
minority nations than the usual versions of moral cosmopolitanism). We 
are entering a theoretical realm in which it is advisable to introduce the 
perspective of Berlin’s value pluralism and Taylor’s politics of recognition 
into the rules of cosmopolitism (Berlin, 1998; Taylor, 1992). Both reflect 
the deep diversity of national pluralism. In order to do so, it is useful to 
introduce into the discussion: 1) an analytical perspective associated with 
the Kantian concept of unsocial sociability of human beings put forward 
in Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, and 
2) an analytical approach to the Ideas of Pure Reason, developed in the 
Transcendental Dialectics of the first Critique, especially when this use 
is related to the form of cosmopolitanism postulated in Kant’s historical 
writings. The section that follows discusses these two Kantian approaches 
from the perspective of national minority rights.
the coNcePt oF uNsocIaL socIaBILIty aNd the Ideas 
oF PuRe ReasoN as eLemeNts oF the moRaL aNd INs-
tItutIoNaL ReFINemeNt oF cosmoPoLItaNIsm IN PLu RI-
NatIoNaL democRacIes
the “unsocial sociability” of manKind
One of  main attractions of current political theory for Kant (especially 
for theories of justice and theories of democracy in a globalised world) is 
that he is an author who is by no means lacking in realism. We are not 
faced with a moralist work in the utopian sense, one that is disconnected 
from reality, nor are we in the presence of someone who shrinks from 
dealing radically with the components of the behaviour of individuals and 
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human collectives. The world is characterised by conflict and evolution 
in a non-linear fashion. Kant would not have been surprised by Darwin’s 
theory of evolution. I believe that, at times, some of Kant’s devotees do 
not fully appreciate this theoretical approach of an author they venerate. 
Fortunately, with Kant we are a long way from any angelic conception of 
mankind and societies. Kant’s cosmopolitanism has less in common with 
Rousseau than with the tragic authors (from Aeschylus to Shakespeare). 
In other words, we are a long way from an ingenuous kind of rationalism 
and moralism.
This is reflected in the title of the small paper Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) and in its very first 
sentence: “Whatever concept we may have, on a metaphysical plane, of 
free will, its phenomenal manifestations, human actions, are determined, 
like other natural phenomena, by the general laws of Nature”. History 
is neither linear nor moves towards a pre-established objective. No 
harmonious society is waiting for us in the future. This is not the horizon 
of the cosmopolitan society that Kant postulates.
One of the key concepts established in Idea for … is the notion of the 
unsocial sociability which characterises mankind. Today we would say 
that the genetic hardware with which we are born is characterised by 
an internal antagonism in our natural dispositions to be in society, that 
is, to be in any society that transmits a set of specific cultural software 
to us. Conflict, rivalry and competition for resources and power are the 
ingredients of social relations. And it is all beyond our will. At times, 
human beings desire harmony, but our nature desires something else, 
and in this dual human condition of supportive egoists lie the roots of 
progress. But they are tragic roots.
Without action there is no tragedy, Aristotle said. It is like the board 
on which the game of our political and moral decisions is played. And 
the human condition is contradictory, among other reasons because the 
values with which we attempt to order the world morally are often 
irreconcilable. Love, justice, liberty, duty and friendship are desirable 
values, but they cannot be synthesised in a harmonious way. Viewed in 
isolation, they lead to dogmatism. 
In this way, the tragedies show what moral and political theories 
usually keep quiet: our instrumental reason is strong, yet our morality 
is fragile. Practical actions are never decided in a totally rational way. 
But Creon, Antigone, Orestes, Brutus, Henry IV and King Lear cannot 
but act, despite the fact that their questions have a number of possible 
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rational and moral responses. The agonistic nature of morality and 
politics becomes tragic not only because any action that we embark 
upon involves some kind of loss, but also because we will not be able to 
avoid the fact that any action we take will have negative effects, whatever 
it is that we decide to do. Human morality reflects an insurmountable 
pluralism of values1 linked to our unsocial sociability. This is one of 
Kant’s most penetrating and fruitful concepts for the realm of politics 
which allows us to better define cosmopolitan society. Progress towards 
a cosmopolitan society, towards a society that applies law universally, 
is slow and plagued by setbacks. In fact, this progress may be seen as: 1) 
progress towards a form of political liberalism in the international sphere 
(international rule of law), and 2) progress towards liberal democracies 
which are more morally and institutionally refined. Both aspects require 
one to understand: a) that value pluralism constitutes an insurmountable 
framework when partially agonistic values and identities which should 
find their own accommodation among themselves come into conflict, and 
b) that it is morally desirable to go deeper into a politics of recognition of 
deep diversities (among them, those that reflect the national pluralism of 
some polities) as an ingredient in the moral and institutional refinement 
of liberal democracies at the beginning of the 21st century.2 
the “ideas of reason” and cosmopolitanism
Another aspect of Kant’s work that has received very little attention is 
related to the potential of the first Critique for political theory, and, more 
specifically, the aspect linked to the role of the Ideas of Pure Reason 
developed in the Transcendental Dialectics. As is well known, unlike 
the Transcendental Analytics, where scientific knowledge based on the 
conjunction between theoretical categories and empirical information 
1 The performance of tragedies, as Aristotle saw, is always accompanied by an 
understanding of the characters and by the fear that the action arouses in the audience. 
Shakespeare situated this plurality of motives within his characters. We are morally 
trapped inside ourselves, and outside there is nothing else.
2 I think that Kantian cosmopolitism is more fruitful than remaining in the Rousseauian 
perspective of constitutional patriotisms, communities of dialogue or the renewed faith 
in deliberative politics. In this sense, I believe that Kant’s work is more politically 
fruitful if it is understood as a key point within the Montaigne-Shakespeare-Hobbes-
Hume-Berlin-Taylor line of reasoning than in that of Rousseau-Kant-Marx-Habermas.
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predominates, the Reason of the Transcendental Dialectics offers us Ideas. 
We can define these ideas, although we are unable to obtain knowledge from 
them because there is a lack of empirical experience at this epistemological 
level.3 The Ideas function as a framework for ordering our experience 
and activity because they give us a global vision of the world. In this 
way, we humans know a lot less than we think. The problems posed by 
Kant’s Reason cannot be either resolved unequivocally or rejected.4 Thus, 
metaphysics is understood here as a disposition (A XI; B 295). Ideas 
provide points of reference for our experience. They are not arbitrary 
inventions but constructions based on the same nature as human reason 
(A 669; B 697). Among these Ideas are those of a cosmopolitan society 
and perpetual peace.
Today we know that language and thought is what most distinguishes 
us as a species, but is probably not what most defines us as individuals. 
It is a characteristic of this strange primate, the product of evolution, 
who calls himself sapiens but whom it continues to be relatively easy 
to deceive and who is adept at deceiving himself (Requejo, 2005a, Final 
remark). How? For example, when the use of the Ideas goes beyond its 
functions, something that can happen quite easily. For Kant, humans 
make correct and incorrect use of the Ideas of Reason. The correct uses 
are those which limit the function of the Ideas to a regulative use, while 
the incorrect uses establish a constitutive use of them, that is, a use which 
attempts to obtain knowledge from them which they are epistemologically 
unable to provide. This incorrect use has disastrous consequences in the 
practical sphere (moral and political)5. In this sense, cosmopolitan society 
is a regulative Idea which protects against constitutive uses of Reason that 
result in the desire to attain absolute order. 
3 First Critique, B 395, Kant’s note; Reason orders (B 671), regulates (B 672) and 
plans (B 814, B 730). It does not work only at dusk, after knowledge, but precedes 
it, regulates it and directs it (B 708). The philosopher is the legislator of Reason, not 
its creator (B 867). Here there is a kind of Kantian revenge: Kant could say to Hegel 
and Marx that “precisely because you show reason when you criticise me, you have 
to return to me”.
4 A VII. In Idea for ... Kant clearly states: “men do not move, like animals, by 
pure instinct, nor, like rational citizens of the world, according to a pre-arranged plan. 
It does not seem to be possible to construct a history of mankind according to a plan” 
(2nd paragraph).
5 The Spanish painter Francisco de Goya (1746-1828), a contemporary of Kant, 
expressed the same idea in the painting The Dreams of Reason Engender Monsters.
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One of Kant’s most decisive contributions is to have seen that the 
constitutive use of Ideas (those which attempt to take human reason 
beyond its limits) cannot be eradicated. This is a metaphysical impulse 
of human reason related with its agonistic underpinnings. One must 
accept the inevitable existence of this impulse and endeavour to combat its 
excesses, the tendency to overstep rational limits (B 421), both in theory 
(for which it is necessary to have freedom of criticism and enlightened 
education) and in practice (for which one needs rights and liberal (not 
republican) institutions).
Kant’s Ideas of Reason are not invented problems (B 386); imagined 
communities are not invented communities. Kant puts forward a complex 
philosophical version, expressed in modern language, of the aim to 
protect against the two main practical dangers detected in classical Greece: 
anarchy and tyranny. For Kant, the theoretical correlate of anarchy is 
scepticism and the correlate of tyranny (or despotism) is dogmatism. 
Cosmopolitanism represents an achievement for the human species, in 
other words, an objective for mankind (First Critique) which encourages 
the species’ progress towards perpetual peace in the empirical world 
(Historical Writings). In this way, cosmopolitanism (and civic patriotism) 
would act, for example, as a restriction on the fanaticism (Schwärmerei) 
and obsession (Wahn) of national patriotism (regardless of whether 
this is exercised by the majority or by a minority). However, it will be 
better to defend moral cosmopolitanism, as Kant perceives it, while at 
the same time accepting the radical pluralism of a set of national (not 
civic) and to some extent predictably competitive patriotisms, which are 
searching for mutual accommodation both in the sphere of democracies 
and internationally
moRaL cosmoPoLItaNIsm aNd mINoRIty RIGhts IN PLu RI-
NatIoNaL democRacIes: ReFINING JustIce aNd INs tI tu-
tIoNs oN a GLoBaL aNd domestIc scaLe
It is obvious that both state and non-state nationalisms have provoked 
practices that fail to respect the propositions of moral cosmopolitanism. 
One only needs to take a look at the history of the 20th century to 
find examples where nationalist positions have been used to justify 
totalitarian practices and the extermination of peoples, such as Nazism, 
Stalinism, Maoism, the events that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, 
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etc. However, nationalism is not intrinsically alien to cosmopolitan 
tenets. In fact, the concepts of nation and citizen originate from the 
same historical experiences in the American and French revolutions of 
the 18th century. Both concepts were and continue to be linked largely 
to states (to existing states and to demands for the creation of new 
states and to reform existing ones). Moral cosmopolitanism has its own 
roots deep in this modern and enlightened tradition, but we know that 
progress also has its darker side. This darker side sometimes reveals itself 
because of the gap which always exists between what the theories say 
and what empirical institutions do (the liberal language of the free and 
equal men has contrasted with exclusions based on gender, class, religion, 
ethnicity, etc., of empirical societies which called themselves liberal). It 
is as much of a mistake to believe that liberalism and cosmopolitanism 
are all sweetness and light, as it is to believe that moral principles should 
be insensitive to context. In fact, today we know that despite the fact 
that a plurinational liberal democracy may respect the civil, political and 
social rights of its citizens, the latter are not usually treated equitably in 
national and cultural terms. 
In this context, moral cosmopolitanism has sometimes functioned as a 
conservative philosophy, that is to say, as a way of legitimising the status 
quo of the national and cultural characteristics dominant in contemporary 
societies. This happens when cosmopolitanism turns a blind eye to, that 
is, when it fails to question or challenge, examples of domination exercised 
by human groups over others on national and cultural grounds. This 
situation means that cosmopolitanism is sometimes associated in practice 
with a lack of respect for individual dignity and a deficient treatment of 
the kinds of universal equality and generality that supporters of moral 
cosmopolitanism defend.
Therefore, the three elements of moral cosmopolitanism mentioned 
above (individualism, universal equality and generality) demand special 
attention when national pluralism is introduced into the fact of pluralism 
of some contemporary societies:
1. Individualism. National pluralism introduces an anthropological 
normative dimension which affects individuals precisely because 
they are “the ultimate units of concern ... rather than, say, family, 
tribes, ethnic, cultural or religious communities, nations or states” 
(Pogge). This means recognising people as moral subjects without 
ignoring them or deciding their characteristics for them.
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2. Universal equality. This second element indicates that the 
individualism mentioned above refers “to every living being equally 
– not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, 
whites ...”. In our case, this would mean expanding the list of 
“men, aristocrats ...” to include persons with a “hegemonic national 
identity in their own state”. This is precisely the dimension of 
political liberty which is marginalised or ignored in the traditional 
theories of political liberalism and cosmopolitanism.
3. Generality of application. This condition would require the inclusion 
of minority national identities in the cosmopolitan rules of juridical 
recognition and guarantee. All national minorities (and not only 
the largest ones in a state) should be the object of normative and 
institutional protection on a global scale.
Political power has often become despotic due to the very tendency of 
human reason to go beyond its limits. Political liberalism successfully carried 
out the task of regulating a series of rights and putting limits on the exercise 
of political power. Thus, it is not a question of establishing a relativist 
or multicultural alternative to liberally-based moral cosmopolitanism 
but to refining it intellectually and morally so that its characteristics of 
individualism, universal equality and generality can find a better practical 
expression in nationally diverse societies (in the intellectual and moral sense 
of the term better). My proposal for the case of plurinational societies is 
a form of cosmopolitanism that:
1.  At the analytical and normative level, is a kind of cosmopolitanism 
that is much more sensitive, both in its concepts and in the 
interpretation of its values, to empirical information that has crucial 
moral and political relevance for individuals who are members 
of minorities. This kind of cosmopolitanism displays the will 
to optimise national diversity morally and politically (without 
uncritically sanctioning the simple reality of existing states in the 
international sphere). Both conditions would encourage greater 
respect for the individual dignity of individuals themselves and the 
development of the individual and collective dimensions which are 
usually excluded from the values of liberty, equality and pluralism 
established in the political and constitutional practices of present-
day democracies.
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2.  At the institutional level, is a kind of cosmopolitanism that recognises 
and guarantees the pluralism of values and identities of these 
societies as well as establishing recognition, juridical guarantees 
and far-reaching self-government for national minorities in its 
constitutional rules (recognition of the plurality of demoi existing 
in the polity; collective rights and liberties, a division of powers 
through consocional and/or federal rules establishing constitutional 
asymmetries when demographic, historical or cultural conditions 
require it, or even with clear rules for secession).
As Kant knew, there is no guarantee that “mankind will progress 
constantly towards a better future”. Conflicts are inherent to human 
collectivities. The important thing is to have institutions capable of settling 
conflicts between legitimate values, interests and identities. In this field, 
we humans have invented nothing better than the charters of rights and 
institutional practices whose origins lie in the political liberalism of modern 
times. Although this is not the subject of this chapter, I am personally 
sceptical, for both theoretical and practical reasons, about the advisability 
of establishing institutions of global democracy. Having said that, I believe 
that moral and political progress for the 21st century should consist in 
setting up institutions of political liberalism, in other words, institutions 
to guarantee rights and the rule of law on a global scale of justice. These 
global rights and rules should take into account the national and cultural 
rights of national minorities (charters of rights which include the option 
to appeal to international courts, which would have the capacity to impose 
sanctions on offenders). This is an indispensable requirement to ensure that 
we progress towards the kind of democracies and international relations 
that are more in tune with the cosmopolitan ideal.6
In short, I advocate the establishment of a kind of moral cosmopolitanism 
which is more attentive to the normative and empirical pluralism of 
contemporary societies in a world in which globalisation is transforming 
economic, political and cultural relations. In theoretical terms, it is a question 
of inserting Berlin and Taylor inside Kant, so to speak, and, in practical 
6 In recent years, I have defended the possibilities of federal models to achieve this 
objective. Not all these models are equally effective. Normally, minority nations will 
not be politically accommodated unless they have at their disposal specific constitutional 
recognition and a singular position through techniques of asymmetric federalism. See 
Requejo 2005a, 3 & 4.
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terms, it means establishing: 1) constitutions based on respect for national 
minorities which put them on equal footing with the majorities, and 2) 
international institutions based on a global rule of law (charters of rights, 
courts, etc.) to which the citizens from minority groups can have recourse 
when they believe that their rights have been violated. This should be a 
kind of cosmopolitanism that is firmly rooted in the unsocial sociability 
of mankind, in what moves people to act in empirical contexts (values, 
but also bonds and identities), and understood not as a utopian ideal but 
as a regulative function of one of the Ideas of Kantian Reason. In this 
way, a global cosmopolitanism that includes the moral and institutional 
perspective of plurinational societies will gradually expand the themes 
and scope of this “society which applies the rule of law universally” of 
which Kant spoke over two centuries ago.
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